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I. INTRODUCTION
I go down to Whittington Hospital in Highgate and wait, walking
up and down in the corridors, until I am told that the baby is born,
that it’s a girl, and that the mother is well. But I don’t see the baby. I
want to see her, but at the same time I don’t want to because I am
afraid of what I might feel. I sign the adoption papers. And then I
walk out into the cold street and go home, assuming that this pas-
sage of my life is closed and expecting never to hear anything
more.1
Years before Rod Stewart would become a Grammy Award winner,
he was an 18-year-old kid with a pregnant girlfriend.2 He was poor
and scared: he had gotten a girl pregnant out of wedlock3 and he knew
his parents would not approve. Wanting to avoid bringing shame upon
his family for his scandalous act, he decided, with his girlfriend, to give
the child up for adoption.4
In 1982, his daughter, Sarah Streeter, showed up on Stewart’s door-
step with her adoptive mother and a reporter ready to meet her fa-
ther.5 Stewart was not home, but they did meet the next day, which
ended up being just that—a meeting that was awkward.6 However,
Stewart and Streeter reconnected in 1985 and began a relationship.
After the death of Streeter’s adoptive mother in 2007, the bond con-
tinued to grow into something special.7
Another musical talent that gave her child up for adoption was Joni
Mitchell. Like Stewart, Mitchell became pregnant out of wedlock and
in order to protect her family, she went to a home to give birth to
Kelly Anderson in 1965.8 Destitute and homeless, Mitchell placed her
baby in a foster home with the hopes of getting her baby back after
finding a job.9 Sadly Mitchell could not get back on her feet, and Kelly
1. ROD STEWART, ROD: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY 42–43 (2012).
2. Id. at 41; Biography.com Editors, Rod Stewart Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM,
http://www.biography.com/people/rod-stewart-9494977 (last visited March 1, 2016).
3. STEWART, supra note 1, at 41–42.
4. Id. at 41–42.
5. Id. at 240.
6. Id. at 241.
7. Id. at 280–81.
8. Q on CBC, Joni Mitchell, on Giving up Her Child for Adoption, YOUTUBE
(Jun. 12, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U7TgqBYByUc.
9. Id.
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Anderson was adopted and named Kilauren Gibb.10 Giving up her
baby weighed heavily on Mitchell as mirrored in her song Little
Green, and in 1996, Mitchell publicly began to seek her daughter.11 In
1997, Mitchell and Gibb were reunited.12
Emmy-nominated actress, Kate Mulgrew, who has starred in Or-
ange is the New Black and Star Trek: Voyager, gave her baby up for
adoption when she was twenty-two years old.13 Although Mulgrew
was single when she became pregnant, her first thought was to have
her mother help raise the baby while she continued working.14 Her
mother would not help and told Mulgrew that adoption was the only
option.15 Mulgrew used Catholic Charities to place her baby for adop-
tion and had the ability to choose the new family she wanted for her
baby.16
Shortly after the placement of Mulgrew’s baby, she began to search
for her daughter.17 It was not until 1998 that Mulgrew ran into the nun
who supervised the adoption and released the adoption registry forms
to both Mulgrew and her daughter, Danielle Gaudette.18 Since then,
Mulgrew and Gaudette have grown very close and see each other as
often as possible.19
Stewart, Mitchell, and Mulgrew dispel a notion that is prevalent in
the minds of people when they think of adoption: the biological par-
ent who gave their child up will never amount to anything. However,
as seen in the above examples, biological parents often give their child
up because they cannot take care of the baby, but do indeed end up
changing their life trajectory and making something out of themselves.
In adoptions, the biological parent and child lose all of their legal
rights to each other; however, in a few states the child retains one
specific right—inheritance through intestate succession. Suppose the
three parental superstars lived in Texas when they made the heart-
wrenching decision to give their baby a better home and subsequently
died intestate in Texas. Would their biological child be able to inherit
from their estate? Additionally, the adoptees’ biological relatives may
accrue an estate worth something. Could the adoptee inherit through
10. Id.; Brian D. Johnson, Joni’s Secret: Mother and Child Reunion, JONIMITCH-
ELL (Apr. 22, 1997), http://www.jonimitchell.com/library/view.cfm?id=91.
11. Johnson, supra note 10; Tom Arnold, The Reunion of Joni Mitchell and Her
Daughter Kilauren Gibb, PARENTS HELPING PARENTS (Mar. 3, 2001), http://father-
sforlife.org/php/Joni_Mitchell.htm.
12. Arnold, supra note 11.
13. Kate Mulgrew, Kate Mulgrew: The Child I Gave Up, AARP (April/May 2015),
http://www.aarp.org/entertainment/style-trends/info-2015/celebrity-kate-mulgrew-
adoption.html.
14. KATE MULGREW, BORN WITH TEETH 75 (Little, Brown and Co., 2015).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 80.
17. Mulgrew, supra note 13.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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their biological birth parents if a grandparent or sibling were to pass
away intestate?
In Texas, the statutes are in conflict as to whether an adopted per-
son is emphatically given the right to inherit intestate through and
from their biological parents. This Note will delve into the history of
adoption law, the adoption law process, differences in the statutes,
and suggest how the Texas Legislature can mend these statutes to be
in harmony with each other. For the purposes of this Note, when
adoptee is mentioned it only refers to a child who was adopted as a
minor.
II. HISTORY OF ADOPTION LAW
Adoptions originate back to the Egyptians, Babylonians, Assyrians,
Greeks, and tribal Germans, but it was not until Roman Civil Law
that adoption reached its widest acceptance and achieved its most
thorough early development.20 The main purpose for adoption during
that time was to provide a family heir in order to further a family line
and “perpetuate the rights of family religious worship.”21 The primary
concern for the adopted child was to inherit all the legal rights that a
natural child would have inherited in order for the continuance of the
family name.22 Today’s standard regarding the best interest of the
child was not a concept during that time period.23
However, English common law was not a proponent for adoption
until the enactment of an adoption statute in 1926.24 With opposing
viewpoints to the Romans, the English held the blood relationship in
high regard believing that an adopted child with familial and inheri-
tance rights would threaten the sanctity of blood relations.25 There-
fore, during the early years of United States history, there were no
adoption statutes.26
The first adoption law statute recognized in the United States was
passed by Massachusetts in 1851.27 However, before the passing of the
1851 statute, adoptions occurred through wills that made bequests to
and provisions for adopted persons.28 Specifically in Texas, civil laws
provided for adoption by deed.29
20. R.S. Erikson, Note, Intestate Succession and Adoption in Utah: A Need for
Legislation, 1969 UTAH L. REV. 56, 57 (1969).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 57–58.
23. Id. at 58.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Fred L. Kuhlmann, Intestate Succession by and from the Adopted Child, 28
WASH. U. L. REV. 221, 222 (1943).
27. Alice Bussiere, The Development of Adoption Law, 1 ADOPTION Q., no. 3,
1998, at 1, 2.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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Under the Massachusetts 1851 enactment, the primary purpose was
to protect children and consider the welfare of the child.30 This was a
novel idea at the time because prior adoptions did not consider adop-
tion as a benefit of the child as much as it was a benefit to adoptive
parents for the purposes of creating an heir or to protect family prop-
erty.31 By 1929, all states had enacted adoption statutes and most
made the best interest of the child the standard for adoption.32
A. Adoptee Inheritance Rights Development in the United States
While the Massachusetts 1851 enactment was not primarily con-
cerned with inheritance rights, it did contain an express provision to
permit the adoptee to inherit from the adoptive parents’ estate.33
However, there was no provision with respect to the adopted child’s
right to inherit from the biological parents.34
The Massachusetts statute was used as a model for most other juris-
dictions throughout the country.35 “It was substantially copied by Wis-
consin in 1853, Maine in 1855, New Hampshire in 1862, Oregon in
1864, Rhode Island in 1866, and Minnesota in 1876.”36 These states
reflected the original statute by not including inheritance rights from
an adoptee to the natural parents.37
When express provisions were put into effect regarding intestacy
rights, “they were, with few exceptions, conciliatory and conservative
– designed to make certain that the time-honored course of intestate
succession among blood relatives would not be disrupted by the inno-
vation.”38 One of the earliest states to include an express provision
regarding intestacy rights occurred 1887 in New York, which “permit-
ted the adopter and the adoptee to inherit from each other but ex-
pressly declared that the child’s rights of inheritance and succession
from natural parents should remain unaffected by the adoption.”39
However, New York’s statute was fast moving compared to most of
the country. Just like the original Massachusetts statute, other state’s
statutes did not include provisions related to inheritance from the




33. Kuhlmann, supra note 26, at 224.
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B. Texas Adoption Law History and Intestacy Development
There are currently two Texas statutes that touch on the issue of
adoptees’ right to inherit from and through their biological parents
should they die intestate. However, the Estates Code gives the person
an absolute right to inherit from their biological parents, while the
Family Code leaves it to the discretion of the judge. Furthermore, the
Estates Code does provide an exception; however, the exception does
not resolve the discrepancy between the Family and Estates code.
At the time that the United States was establishing itself as a nation,
Texas residents, under Spanish-Mexican rule, were allowed to adopt.40
Under the Spanish-Mexican system, if an adopted child had siblings
that were natural children of the adoptive parents, the adopted child
could not inherit from the parents.41 After the Spanish-Mexican laws
were repealed in 1840, Texas enacted legislation with the influence of
French and Spanish law.42
For a period of ten years, “the only method of effecting a legal
adoption creating rights of inheritance in the adopted child was by
special legislative act.”43 The first adoption law statute passed in Texas
was the Adoption Act of 1850, which predated the Massachusetts
act.44 Under This Act, an adopted child could inherit no more than
one-fourth of the adoptive parents’ estate if the adoptive parents had
natural children from their marriage; however, if there were no natu-
ral children then the adopted child was considered the full “legal
heir.”45 There was no mention of an adopted child inheriting through
or from a natural parent.46
The Revised Civil Statutes of 1879 and 1895 mirror each other as
they immediately dive into adoption matters with Title I.47 Both of
these statutes reflect the 1850 Adoption Act as the inheritance rights
for adoptees were limited to one-fourth of their adoptive parents and
silent on the issue of inheritance from or through the natural
parents.48
The 1911 Revised Civil Statutes expanded the arena of adoption.49
Increasing from two articles to eight articles within Title I, the revision
elaborated on how a child should be adopted and how the adoptive
40. 39 ALOYSIUS A. LEOPOLD & GERRY W. BEYER, TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES:
MARITAL PROPERTY AND HOMESTEADS § 22.6 (2015).
41. Id.
42. Id.; 9 GERRY W. BEYER, TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES: TEXAS LAW OF WILLS § 5.1
(3d ed. 2014) [hereinafter BEYER WILLS].
43. BEYER WILLS, supra note 42, § 5.2.
44. LEOPOLD & BEYER, supra note 40.
45. Id.
46. See BEYER WILLS, supra note 42, § 5.3.
47. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 1, 2 (West 1879); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
arts. 1, 2 (West 1895).
48. Id.
49. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 1–8 (West 1911).
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parents should treat the adopted child. Article 4 barred natural par-
ents from “exercising any authority, control or custody over such child
as against the party so adopting him,” but neither this article, nor any
other, expressly state inheritance rights regarding adopted children
and natural parents. Additionally, an adoptee’s inheritance right from
their adoptive parents was still limited to the one-fourth rule, if appli-
cable.50 Following the 1911 revisions were the 1925 Revised Civil Stat-
utes; however, other than formatting changes, the 1925 statutes
substantively reflected the 1911 statutes.51
In 1931, the Texas Legislature repealed the 1850 Act and estab-
lished a new Act that emphasized the welfare of the child involved in
the adoption proceeding and granted more rights under intestate suc-
cession.52 Under the 1931 Revised Civil Statutes, two notable provi-
sions expanded an adopted child’s right to inherit:  (1) the adopted
child was considered a natural child of the adoptive parents, therefore
allowing the adopted child to inherit as a natural child; and (2) it pre-
served the right of the adopted child to inherit from their natural
parents.53
With regards to the first provision, the one-fourth rule was elimi-
nated, and the adopted child was considered as a natural child of the
adopted parents and could fully inherit.54 With regards to the second
provision, there was still some confusion. “The language was not clear
if the adopted child should continue to inherit through its natural par-
ents, as well as from, its natural parents.”55 If the adopted child could
inherit both through and from the natural parents, the adopted child
could inherit in a dual capacity.56 For example, “if a child is adopted
by its grandparents, the child may be entitled to inherit as a child of
the adopting parents and also as a representative of its deceased natu-
ral parent.”57
Subsequent to the 1931 Legislative Act, Texas made major changes
in adoption law in 1951.58 Specifically, the language included a sen-
tence that clarified the confusion whether a child inherits from and
through the natural parent by adding, “the natural parent or parents
and their kind shall not inherit from or through said child, but said
child shall inherit from and through its natural parent or parents.”59
50. Id.
51. Compare TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 41–46 (West 1925) with TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 1–8 (West 1911).
52. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 41–46 (West 1925); see also BEYER
WILLS, supra note 42, § 5.7.





58. BEYER WILLS, supra note 42, § 5.7.
59. Id. at § 5.14.
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This made it clear that an adopted child can inherit “through its natu-
ral parents from the kindred of its natural parents.”60
Shortly after the 1951 clarification, the Legislature enacted the Pro-
bate Code in 1955.61 The 1955 Probate Code incorporated an
adoptee’s intestacy rights in section 40 titled Inheritance By and From
an Adopted Child.62 However, the Probate Code was not a true code
because it was enacted in 1955, before the 1963 Legislature began the
process of codifying laws.63
In 1969, the Legislature continued codifying laws with the Family
Code. The Legislature passed Title 1 of the Family Code, which only
contained laws relating to the husband and wife, record keeping of the
Bureau of Vital Statistics, and providing an effective date.64 It was not
until 1973 that the Legislature passed Title II of the Family Code re-
lating to parents and children, which included a chapter regarding
adoption.65 The provision regarding adoptees inheritance rights from
their natural parents was moved to the Family Code’s General Provi-
sions section.66 This is also when the Legislature added the language
“unless the court otherwise provides.”67
The current reading of Section 161.206(b) from the Family Code
states, “an order terminating the parent-child relationship divests the
parent and child of all legal rights and duties with respect to each
other, except that the child retains the right to inherit from and through
the parent unless the court otherwise provides.”68 The statute clearly
states that an adopted person can inherit from their biological parents
per a judge’s discretion. The current language reflects that 1973 inclu-
sion of Title II.
A change in law occurred to both the Probate Code and the Family
Code in 2005.69 The Legislature severed the right of adult adoptees to
inherit from and through their biological parent.70 This change in the
Family Code led to the Estates Code carving an exception that cross-
references Family Code Section 162.507(c); however, it only leads to
the adult exception and not to a judge’s discretion.71 Section
60. Id.
61. See GERRY W. BEYER, TEXAS ESTATE PLANNING STATUTES WITH COMMEN-
TARY 105 (AuthorHouse ed., 2015–2017 ed. 2015) [hereinafter BEYER
COMMENTARY].
62. GERRY W. BEYER, TEXAS PROBATE CODE WITH COMMENTARY 28 (Aug. 19,
2013), http://www.professorbeyer.com/Estates_Code/Texas_Probate_Code_(08-19-
2013).pdf.
63. BEYER COMMENTARY, supra note 61.
64. H.B. 53, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1969).
65. S.B. 168, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1973).
66. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.07 (West 1973).
67. Id.
68. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.206(b) (West 2007) (emphasis added).
69. See generally BEYER COMMENTARY, supra note 61, at 187.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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201.054(b) of the Estates Code states, “the adopted child inherits from
and through the child’s natural parent or parents, except as provided
by Section 162.057(c), Family Code.”72
When discussing the 2005 amendment during the Committee hear-
ing, a witness for the bill made a point to say that he was fine with
adult adoptees losing their inheritance rights from and through his or
her biological parents but will not support it if the bill changed minor
adoptees’ rights.73
In 2009, the Texas Legislature began codifying the Probate Code
into today’s Estates Code.74 While the current statute for adoption
inheritance rights is now found in section 201.054(b), the substance of
the language is the same as Probate Code Section 40.75 However, even
during the codification, the Legislature included the adult exception
but did not include the judge’s discretion exception.
III. THE ADOPTION OF A CHILD
Adoption in Texas involves a two-step process: (1) the termination
of the parent-child relationship between the child and the biological
parents and (2) the adoption itself.76
A. Termination of The Parent-Child Relationship
Chapter 161 of the Family Code controls the termination of the par-
ent-child relationship. In order for an adoption to take place, there
must be a pre-existing order terminating the parent-child relationship
between the adoptee and the biological parents.77 A court will grant
an order terminating the parent-child relationship if the court finds
clear and convincing evidence grounds to do so.78 Once the parent-
child relationship is terminated, the child and parents are divested of
all legal rights, “except that the child retains the right to inherit from
and through the parent unless the court otherwise provides.”79
In the case where there is not a previously executed parent-child
relationship termination, the suit for termination can be joined with
the suit for adoption.80 If the adoption is a stepparent adoption, the
biological parent who is the stepparent’s spouse does not have to ter-
72. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 201.054(b) (West 2014).
73. Hearings on Tex. H.B. 204 Before the House Comm. on Judiciary, 79th Leg.,
R.S. (Feb. 14, 2005) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Glenn Karisch) http://
tlchouse.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=23&clip_id=6154.
74. BEYER COMMENTARY, supra note 61.
75. EST. § 201.054(b).
76. Dan Tilly, Note, Confidentiality of Adoption Records in Texas: A Good Case
for Defining Good Cause, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 531, 534 (2005).
77. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.206(b) (West 2007).
78. FAM. § 161.206(a).
79. FAM. § 161.206(b).
80. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.001(b)(1) (West 2015).
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minate his or her rights.81 Once the decree terminating the parent-
child relationship is complete, the court considers it “final, irrevoca-
ble, and forever divests the parent of his or her natural and legal rights
to the child.”82
Most parent-child relationship terminations are done voluntarily by
the biological parents.83 The birth parents must sign an affidavit of
voluntary relinquishment of parental rights to ensure the termina-
tion.84 The birth mother must wait 48 hours after the birth of her child
to sign the affidavit85 and it must be made “voluntarily, knowingly,
intelligently, and with full awareness of the legal consequences.”86 The
court will only set aside an irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment if
proof “by a preponderance of evidence, that the affidavit was exe-
cuted as a result of coercion, duress, fraud, deception, undue influence
or overreaching” is present.87
Involuntary termination of the parent-child relationship is governed
by Section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code.88 A court must find
clear and convincing evidence that the biological parent has commit-
ted an act listed in the section and it’s in the best interest of the child
for an involuntary termination to take place.89 However, “courts con-
strue the proceedings and the statutes strictly in favor of the parent”
as “parental rights involve an essential and basic civil right, far more
precious than property rights, which is fundamentally constitutional in
nature.”90
B. The Effect of the Adoption Order
An adoption order “creates the parent-child relationship between
the adoptive parent and the child for all purposes.”91 The adoption
order creates a legal relationship between the child and adoptive par-
ents with all of the “rights, powers, and responsibilities . . . who prior
to the adoption were generally legal strangers.”92 Additionally, the
81.  FAM. § 162.001(b)(2).
82. Tilly, supra note 76, at 534–35.
83. Id. at 535.
84. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.103 (West 2015).
85. FAM. § 161.103(a)(1).
86. Tilley, supra note 76, at 535.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 536.
89. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.
of 84th Leg.); Interest of V.K.S., NO. 14-15-00729-CV, 2016 WL 55248, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 11, 2016).
90. Tilly, supra note 76, at 536.
91. Id. at 538; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.017(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015
Reg. Sess. of 84th Leg.).
92. Tilly, supra note 76, at 538; In the Interest of an Unnamed Child, 584 S.W.2d
476, 478 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
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adoption effectively severs the legal relationship between the adoptee
and the biological parent except for the adoptee’s inheritance rights.93
C. Sealing the Records
The court may require—on the motion of a party or the court’s own
motion—the file, minutes, or both be sealed in a suit terminating the
parent-child relationship94 and a suit requesting an adoption.95 The
records following an adoption are confidential and cannot be opened
“except for good cause under an order of the court that issued the
order.”96 Neither the statute nor case law defines what good cause is,
but there are cases that determine what is not considered good
cause.97
The Texas Supreme Court held in Little v. Smith that asking the
court to open adoption records “to see if any inheritance claims ex-
isted” might not qualify as good cause.98 The Little court did oblige to
opening the adoption records; however, the Supreme Court did not
set a precedence obligating courts to accept seeking inheritance claims
as good cause.99 In fact, the overall tone of the opinion suggests that
courts should not accept potential inheritance claims as good cause
since the Court noted that, “confidentiality is given a high priority in
the legislative scheme.”100
IV. TRENDING TOWARD OPENNESS IN ADOPTION
The United States as a whole, including Texas, is in the process of
coming full circle regarding the open-close-open adoption scheme.101
Although open adoption is not yet fully embraced, there is an increas-
ing movement towards acceptance and understanding of open adop-
tions.102 Through the fight towards open adoption, inheritance rights
have stayed intact in Texas. Texas has followed the nation’s guiding
way in the closed-to-open adoption scheme, yet become the outlier
regarding inheritance rights.
93. Tilly, supra note 76, at 538.
94. Id. at 539–40; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.210 (West, Westlaw through 2015
Reg. Sess. of 84th Leg.).
95. Tilly, supra note 76, at 539; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.021 (West, Westlaw
through 2015 Reg. Sess. of 84th Leg.).
96. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.022 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. of
84th Leg.).
97. Tilly, supra note 76, at 539.
98. Little v. Smith, 943 S.W.2d 414, 418 (Tex. 1997).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 419.
101. See Malinda L. Seymore, Openness in International Adoption, 46 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 163, 164–70 (2015).
102. Id. at 164–65.
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A. History of Closed Adoptions
As previously mentioned, the beginnings of adoption for Texas oc-
curred in 1850103 and gained national notoriety in 1852 with the Mas-
sachusetts Adoption Act of 1851.104 During these times, adoptions
were generally open because adoptions were informal, adopted chil-
dren were older thus they knew of their birth parents, and were gener-
ally “arranged between the biological and adoptive parents who knew
the identity and whereabouts of the other.”105
However, adoptees and adoptive parents would develop secrecy
against the birth parents because of the notion that birth parents
should not know the location of their biological children.106 Eventu-
ally, when the birth parents would sign the relinquishment forms, so-
cial workers would include a clause requiring the birth parents to
agree not to “seek out the child, learn the child’s location, or interfere
in any way with the child or adoptive parents.”107 The mindset behind
moving towards a more secretive adoption had to do with the reform-
ers who felt they were “saving” the children and reunions with the
birth parents would “ruin” the children.108 This notion that birth par-
ents reconnecting and “ruining” their biological child manifested into
another fear that biological parents would intercept the children and
their affections from the adoptive family, thus dissuading people from
adopting as a whole.109
Before World War II, it was recommended that secrecy remain in
adoption proceedings; however, there were hardly any laws requiring
closed adoptions.110 Although there were scarce laws regarding se-
crecy, a step was taken toward confidentiality when states began pro-
viding “amended birth certificates” to adoptees that listed only the
adoptive parents.111 Still though, the original birth certificate with the
names of the birth parents was not sealed and available to the adop-
tive parents and the adoptee.112 The purpose of amended birth certifi-
cates was to keep the adoption proceedings between the adoption
triad—the adoptee, adoptive parents, and birth parents—and to pre-
vent the public from exploiting the “stigma of shame and scandal that
surrounded the adoption and illegitimacy.”113
103. LEOPOLD & BEYER, supra note 40.
104. Seymore, supra note 101, at 168.
105. Id. at 168–69.
106. Id. at 169.
107. Id. at 169–70.
108. Id. at 169.
109. Id. at 170.
110. See id. at 170.
111. Id. at 171.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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Ultimately, the scheme of secrecy transitioned into legislative acts
of confidentiality after World War II.114 Before the war, adoptees
were often relinquished by married or divorced couples simply be-
cause they could not financially support the children.115 After the war,
the nation viewed biological parents differently as they were often
young, unwed mothers stigmatized as mentally sick.116 The notion of
“saving” children and the fear of biological reunions transpired into
birth mothers being “very disturbed” and “sick youths” that should
not have any contact or information about the adoption for the pro-
tection of the child or the adoptive parents.117 The laws of confidenti-
ality evolved over time: by 1948, most states sealed court records of
adoption; by 1960, adoptees’ access to birth certificates were sealed in
twenty-nine states; by the mid-1960s, the adoption records and origi-
nal birth certificate were sealed to all.118
The 1980s and 1990s are when the concept of open adoption took
hold in the United States.119 Since then, supporters of the open adop-
tion movement have identified many benefits involved with open
adoption.120
B. Texas Moving Forward
By 1931, the files and court records in adoption proceedings could
only be opened by the parties and their attorneys unless the court
deemed otherwise.121 Interestingly enough, this is also when the Leg-
islature included that adopted children could still inherit from their
natural parents.122 It can be concluded that Texas was on board with
keeping the adoption information privy to only the adoption triad;
thereby, permitting ease of access of adoptees to inherit from their
natural parents.
When the Legislature incorporated Article II, the parent-child rela-
tionship, into the Family Code in 1973, the Legislature moved the
records file to General Provisions section 11.123 During this time is
when the language changed to maintain confidentiality after the adop-
tion proceeding.124 What was once open to the adoption triad,
changed to complete confidentiality as the language stated: “no per-
114. See id. at 172–73.
115. Id. at 172.
116. Id. at 172–73.
117. Id. at 169, 173.
118. Id. at 172–73.
119. DEBORAH H. SIEGEL & SUSAN LIVINGSTON SMITH, EVAN B. DONALDSON
ADOPTION INST., OPENNESS IN ADOPTION: FROM SECRECY AND STIGMA TO KNOWL-
EDGE AND CONNECTIONS 6 (2012), http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/old/publications/
2012_03_OpennessInAdoption.pdf.
120. Id.
121. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 46a, § 10 (West Supp. 1931).
122. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 46a, § 9 (West Supp. 1931).
123. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.17 (West 1973).
124. Id.
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son is entitled to access to or information from these records except as
provided by this section or an order of a district court . . . for good
cause.”125 The timing of the Legislature falls in line with the rest of the
country’s timeline in maintaining confidentiality.
Interestingly though, even in this shift towards closed adoptions, the
Legislature still kept adoptees inheritance rights intact.126 However,
this is where the language “unless the court otherwise provides” was
added.127 It seems that Texas had one foot in and one foot out of the
confidentiality craze. Texas did not want to strictly take away
adoptees’ inheritance rights, but valued confidentiality enough to ac-
cept the birth parents’ or adoptive parents’ wishes should either of the
parental units want the adoptee’s rights terminated.
1. Open Adoption
Open adoption can be defined as an “adoption where the birth fam-
ily and adoptive family meet before the adoption and have some form
of continuing contact after the adoption.”128 Open adoption ranges on
a continuum as not all adoptions and circumstances are the same.129
Adoptions can be semi-open or mediated where the birth family and
adoptive family have contact through a mediator leaving some privacy
for the respective families.130 Disclosed adoption is where the identi-
ties of the parties are known and there is direct communication.131
There are even adoptions that fall along the continuum of semi-open
to disclosed and have different structures or arrangements.132
Upbring, formerly Lutheran Social Services of Texas, led the way
towards open adoption in 1977.133 Upbring mediated between the two
families by exchanging letters and photos before evolving into face-to-
face meetings in 1981.134 Along with Texans gaining confidence with
open adoption, scholars and adoptees urged the Texas Legislature to
make advancements towards open adoption policies.135
125. Id.
126. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.07 (West 1973).
127. Id.
128. Seymore, supra note 101, at 175.
129. CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, WORKING WITH BIRTH AND





133. B. Lee Phillips, Open Adoption: A New Look at Adoption Practice and Policy
in Texas, 43 BAYLOR L. REV. 407, 410 (1991).
134. Id.
135. Tilly, supra note 76, at 543.
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2. Non-Identifying Information
In 1984, the Texas Legislature permitted the Texas Department of
State Health Services Vital Statistics to collect medical and social in-
formation on birth families.136 This non-identifying information can be
updated years after the adoption should the birth family want to.137
The Vital Statistics Unit will attempt to locate the adoptive parents or
agency with the updated information.138 Access to an adoptee’s bio-
logical history is a step in the direction towards open adoption; how-
ever, non-identifying information severely limits actual contact with
the biological family and limits a good-cause reasoning for opening
original birth certificates.
3. Texas’s Mutual Consent Voluntary Adoption Registry
Concurrent with collecting non-identifying information, the Texas
Legislature also set up a voluntary adoption registry.139 The purpose
of the registry is to “provide for the establishment of mutual consent
voluntary adoption registries through which adoptees, birth parents,
and biological siblings may voluntarily locate each other.”140 The reg-
istry is also a step in the right direction towards open adoption, and
while it does not expressly persuade adoptees and biological family
members to seek each other out, it does give opportunity to those who
would otherwise not have it.
4. Limited Post-Termination Contact
In 2003, the Texas Legislature took another step in the direction
towards open adoption when it permitted courts to allow limited post-
termination contact within termination orders.141 In order for the
court to allow post-termination contact, the termination has to be vol-
untary and has to be in the best interest of the child.142 The contact
may include: (1) receiving specified information regarding the child;
(2) written communication to the child; and (3) limited access to the
child.143 Additionally, post-termination contact “does not affect the
finality of a termination order or grant standing to a parent whose
136. TEX. DEP’T OF STATE HEALTH SERVS. VITAL STAT., Texas Adoption Informa-




139. Tilly, supra note 76, at 544.
140. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.401 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. of
84th Leg.).
141. Tilly, supra note 76, at 545–46.
142. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.2061(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.
of 84th Leg.).
143. FAM. § 161.2061(b).
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parental rights have been terminated to file any action” seeking post-
termination contact.144
Texas is trending toward an increased acceptance of open adoption,
which in turn could lead to an increase in judicial preservation of in-
heritance rights or legislative action to emphatically give adoptees the
inheritance rights across the board. Returning to an open adoption
scheme in Texas could be the push the Legislature needs to mend the
statutes to be in conformity with one another.
V. CURRENT PRACTICES
Across the United States, and within Texas, there are various prac-
tices concerning an adoptee’s right to inherit intestate through and
from the natural parents. As previously discussed and seen in the
Texas statutes, the court decree that finalizes the adoption ends the
legal relationship between the birth parent and the adopted child.145
However, we know that Texas allows an exception—the right to in-
herit through and from the natural parent.146 This section will look at
other states that provide exceptions similar to Texas and how judges in
Texas tackle this matter.
A. Other State Codes
Currently, along with Texas, there are three other states that allow
an adopted child to inherit from the birth parents: Kansas, Louisiana,
and Rhode Island.147 A bit different from the Texas code, Alaska,
Idaho, Illinois, and Maine allow for a continuation of inheritance
rights if so stated in the adoption decree.148 Approximately fourteen
states allow an adopted person to inherit from their deceased natural
parent as long as the adoptive parent is a stepparent and the natural
parent’s right was not terminated prior to death.149 Continuing the
varying degree of inheriting through the natural parents, Pennsylvania
provides that an adopted person may inherit from the estate of a birth
relative, other than a birth parent, who has maintained a familial rela-
tionship with the adopted person.150
There has, however, been a declining trend amongst states in al-
lowing inheritance rights between an adoptee and natural parents. As
the history above reveals, inheritance from natural parents was not on
144. FAM. § 161.2061(f).
145. CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, INTESTATE INHERITANCE RIGHTS
FOR ADOPTED PERSONS 2 (2012), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/
inheritance.pdf.
146. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.206(b) (West 2007).
147. See INTESTATE INHERITANCE RIGHTS FOR ADOPTED PERSONS, supra note 145,
at 2. A 2015 check of current state law reveals one state, Wyoming, has amended their
statute and cut off inheritance rights from natural parents. See id.
148. Id. at 4, 12, 15.
149. Id. at 2.
150. Id.
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the forefront of legislative minds when adoption laws were first en-
acted. It was not until 1887 for the first state, New York, and 1931 for
Texas to amend the statute including intestacy rights between adoptee
and natural parents.151
A 1943 law review article revealed that twelve states expressly per-
mitted for an adoptee to inherit from their natural parents, but out of
those twelve only one remains true today—Texas.152 In 1943, five
states expressly denied the right.153 Out of those five, Louisiana cur-
rently expressly permits the right, and Pennsylvania has somewhat
modified the right.154 The law review article also revealed that thirty-
two states had no explicit provision, but of those thirty-two, Kansas
and Rhode Island currently permit intestacy succession from natural
parents; Idaho, Illinois, and Maine currently provide the possibility for
intestacy succession. At the time of this article, Alaska was not yet a
state; therefore, only forty-nine states were taken into account. How-
ever, a later law review article published in 1969 reveals that Alaska
did allow inheritance rights from the bloodline.155 But even by the late
1960s, the number of states honoring inheritance rights from the natu-
ral parents decreased to only nine.156
The decline in states awarding inheritance rights to adoptees oc-
curred around the same time that the nation was gearing toward
closed adoption. Thus, if an adoption is closed, the bloodline inheri-
tance is likely to be severed by the impossibility of an adoptee finding
his or her biological parents. Other state legislatures must have real-
ized the closed adoption repercussions on inheritance rights and ex-
cluded the right altogether, but Texas held on to inheritance rights
even in the face of closed adoptions.
B. Current Practices in Texas
1. Inheriting Through the Natural Parents
In B.C.S. v. D.A.E., the Texas Court of Appeals held that B.C.S.
and M.M.E. could inherit from their half-sibling through their natural
mother after the natural mother gave B.C.S. and M.M.E. up for adop-
tion.157 Peggy Schmeltz had two children during her first marriage,
B.C.S. and D.A.E.158 The parental rights of both natural parents were
terminated in the adoption decree.159 Schmeltz remarried and had two
151. BEYER WILLS, supra note 42; Kuhlmann, supra note 26, at 225.
152. Kuhlmann, supra note 26, at 229.
153. Id.
154. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1218 (2003); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2514(7)
(West 1999).
155. See Erikson, supra note 20, at 78.
156. See id. at 78, 80.
157. B.C.S. v. D.A.E., 818 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1991, writ denied).
158. Id.
159. Id.
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other children, S.R.M. and B.N.M.160 The second marriage also failed
resulting in a third marriage and another child, B.C.S.161 B.N.M., a
child of the second marriage, died intestate during an automobile
accident.162
The court held that “had the Legislature intended to prevent an
adopted child from inheriting from other children of the natural par-
ent, it would have said so.”163 Adoption is a statutory proceeding, as it
did not exist at common law.164 Before the enactment of the Family
Code, an adopted child’s status as to all persons other than the adop-
tive parents was the same as it would have been had no adoption oc-
curred.165 Thus, “if a statute deprives a person of a common-law right,
the statute will be strictly construed in the sense that it will not be
extended beyond its plain meaning or applied to cases not clearly
within its purview.”166 Therefore, “the Family Code increases the
rights of the adopted rather than restricts them.”167
2. Limitations Inheriting Through and From Natural Parents
In Patton v. Shamburger, the Supreme Court of Texas held that an
adopted person was not allowed to inherit workmen’s compensation
death benefits from their natural father.168 Jack Patton had two chil-
dren during his first marriage.169 Patton and his first wife divorced,
and subsequently his first wife’s second husband adopted the two chil-
dren in 1963.170 In 1965, Patton was killed during the course of his
employment.171
The statute in 1963 was under Section 9 of Article 46a of Vernon’s
Annotated Texas Civil Statutes; however, the substance is the same as
the current Estates Code, which allows an adopted child to inherit
from their natural parents.172 The Court found that the rights to work-
men’s compensation benefits are not obtained through inheritance but
are conferred by statute, thus the adoption statutes relating to inheri-
tance were not applicable in this case.173 The Court held that adopted









168. Patton v. Shamburger, 431 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Tex. 1968).
169. Id. at 506.
170. Id. at 506–07.
171. Id. at 507.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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workmen’s compensation statute but are minor children of the adop-
tive parents.174
A similar case, Go Intern., Inc. v. Lewis, held Patton controlling and
denied the adopted children of their natural, deceased parents’ wrong-
ful death damages.175 The deceased, natural parents, Ray and Dovie
Wampler, died in an automobile accident because an employee of Go
International turned onto the path of the Wampler’s motorcycle, kill-
ing them instantly.176 The Wamplers left five minor children; however,
the two oldest had been adopted by an aunt at a young age because
the Wamplers were sick and unemployed.177 The two children took
their aunt’s last name, Mills.178 The trial court awarded actual and ex-
emplary damages to the Mills children.179
The court of appeals reversed because the wrongful death action is
“purely statutory and does not inure to the benefit of the children of a
deceased by reason of inheritance.”180 The court followed Patton and
held that the adoption statute clearly divests the natural parents of
“all legal rights, privileges, duties, and powers” of the child.181 Like
the Patton court, the court of appeals held, “if the Legislature had
intended to make an exception with regard to those rights which ac-
crue under the wrongful death statute, it could easily have said so.”182
The two mentioned cases show that while the adopted child does
have the right to inherit from the natural parents, the limit exists to
inheritance only and not possible statutory awards. Notable about the
Go, Intern. case is that the only statute referenced regarding adoption
law was solely the Family Code, which creates the exception of a
judge’s discretion.183 The Patton case was decided before the Family
Code was enacted, thus the Civil Code only had one place to turn to
for adoption.184
VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Through the years of adoption history, the view on the purpose of
adoption has changed. As discussed above, the first use of adoption
was for purposes of intestate and carrying on the family name,185 then
174. Id. at 508.
175. Go Intern, Inc. v. Lewis, 601 S.W.2d 495, 499 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1980, writ
ref’d n.r.e.).
176. Id. at 497.
177. Id. at 497–98.
178. Id. at 497.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 498.
181. Id. at 499.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 498.
184. Compare Patton v. Shamburger, 431 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. 1968) with H.B. 53, 61st
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1969). (showing Patton decided before the Family Code was
enacted).
185. See Erickson, supra note 20, at 58.
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it was considered a threat to the bloodlines and only used as a practi-
cal matter to protect land,186 but then Americans encompassed the
best interest of the child moral and enacted statutes to protect the
adopted child and his or her family. Additionally, the policy consider-
ations for inheritance purposes have also changed throughout time
and continue to do so.
All fifty states consider adopted children as the adoptive parents’
blood-child with full inheritance rights.187 Texas, and three other
states, allow children to inherit from their natural parents.188 The dif-
ference in the statutes leads to different, more modern, policy
considerations.
A. Policy For Inheritance Through and From Natural Parents
Policy considerations for allowing adopted children to inherit from
and through their natural parents fall into two camps: (1) the adopted
child did not consent to losing their inheritance rights;189 and (2) the
old adage that “blood is thicker than water.”190
Courts have pointed out that while the natural parents have con-
sented to the adoption, thus giving up their right to inherit from their
natural child, the adopted child has not given any consent to losing
natural inheritance rights.191 Adopted children are the foremost peo-
ple affected by the matter, have no one to consent for them, do not
consent on their own, and therefore should not lose the right to inherit
from their natural parents.192
This policy consideration is weighted heavily and even reflected in
the 2005 amendment severing adult adoptee inheritance rights.193 The
main reason behind severing an adult adoptee’s inheritance rights
from the birth parents is that an adult consents to terminating the
birth parents as their legally recognized parents.194 Additionally, in an
adult adoption, the birth parents may not have consented to terminat-
ing the parent-child relationship.195 Notice to the parents is not neces-
sary since the adult adoptee does not need parental consent.196
Therefore, it would not be fair to the birth parents because, unlike in
186. See id.
187. INTESTATE INHERITANCE RIGHTS FOR ADOPTED PERSONS, supra note 145, at
3.
188. Id. at 2.
189. Emilio S. Binavince, Adoption and the Law of Descent and Distribution: A
Comparative Study and a Proposal for Model Legislation, 51 CORNELL L. Q. 152, 166
(1965).
190. See Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077,
1131 (2003).
191. Binavince, supra note 189, at 166.
192. Id.
193. See generally S.B. 168, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1973).
194. See Hearings, supra note 73 (statement of Rep. Goodman).
195. See id.
196. See id.
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minor adoptee cases, birth parents may not have any control over the
legal termination and should not be subjected to their estate passing
to a child who terminated the relationship.
The second policy reason, and likely the lesser-weighted and more
antiquated one, is the “importance of passing property through the
bloodline.”197 This policy reason bolsters the idea that even though
adoption can physically separate the child and birth parents, they will
always share blood with each other and the child maintains the blood
right to the estate. The natural parents are cut off in all parental and
legal respects; however, the child is still able to take property as if the
adoption never happened.
B. Policy Against Inheritance Through and From Natural Parents
There are more policy considerations against adopted children in-
heriting through and from their natural parents that include complete
assimilation into the adoptive family, best interest of the child, dual
inheritance, the prolonging of settling estates, and the matter of it be-
ing practical.
The policy reason that proves most weighted upon is that complete
assimilation into the adoptive family should be the first priority. The
statutory right that keeps adopted children connected to their natural
parents does not advance the philosophy of strengthening and pre-
serving the new family unit.198 Adoption is a way to sever the relation-
ship between the natural family, and by having a statutory right that
effectively keeps an adopted child linked to their natural family
defeats the purpose of keeping the natural parents confidential or
completely severing the ties to the natural parents.199
Along with assimilation into the new family unit, the partner policy
consideration is the best interest of the child.200 It is traditionally as-
sumed that the best interest of the child is to have and be a part of one
family.201 Thus as discussed above, the best way to ensure a fresh start
with a new family is to sever all ties relating back to the natural family,
including inheritance rights.202
Another policy reason against inheritance from the natural parents
is the result of dual inheritance.203 Dual inheritance is the result of
inheriting from both the adoptive and natural families.204 A conse-
quence of allowing dual inheritance could also work against the child’s
197. Cahn, supra note 190, at 1131.
198. Erikson, supra note 20, at 68.
199. See generally id.
200. Peter Wendel, Inheritance Rights and the Step-Partner Adoption Paradigm:
Shades of the Discrimination Against Illegitimate Children, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 351,
362–63 (2005).
201. Id. at 363.
202. Id. at 363–64.
203. Erikson, supra note 20, at 68.
204. Id.
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best interest.205 If the adopted child is granted the same rights as bio-
logical children in the adoptive family plus one more, that could un-
dermine the cohesive new family unit.206 For the best interest of the
child and to further the full integration of the adopted child into the
new family, the adopted child and the natural child of the adoptive
family should be afforded the same rights—not more or less.207
Additionally, dual inheritance can create inequity inheritance
problems when a natural relative adopts the child.208 An instance
could arise in a situation where a grandmother adopts her grandchild
as her own child.209 Thus under the statutory laws, the adopted child
could inherit from the grandmother as a child and through the natural
parent as their child, therefore inheriting in a dual capacity.210 In the
past, courts have looked at this inequity as an exceptional and occa-
sional consequence conferred by a statutory right because heirship is
not natural. However, other courts deny the right of dual inheritance
when the adoption alters natural familial relationships, such as a
grandchild becoming a child, by merging the former classification with
the latter.211
Another policy consideration against inheritance from the natural
bloodline is the prolonging of settling estates.212 Before an estate can
be settled, heirs of the deceased must be located or be given adequate
notice; therefore, the estate must remain open for a period of time
that might be longer than necessary.213 The twin pillar of the settling
estates policy is the practicality policy.214 It might not be practical for
the adopted child to be located after the adoption proceedings are
over.215 Moreover, if the adoptee is located, there could be emotional
consequences to the adoptee, adoptive parents, and natural family.216
The adoptee might face hardship in coming face to face with his bio-
logical family or may feel dividing loyalties between his adoptive fam-
ily and biological family’s inheritance.217 The post adoption disruption
can weaken the adoptive family ties, and if the adoptee is still a young
205. Id. at 69.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 68.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 68–69.
211. Id. at 69.
212. Timothy Hughes, Comment, Intestate Succession and Stepparent Adoptions:
Should Inheritance Rights of an Adopted Child be Determined by Blood or by Law?,
1988 WIS. L. REV. 321, 339 (1988).
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should
Get What and Why (The Impact of Adoptions, Adult Adoptions, and Equitable Adop-
tions on Intestate Succession and Class Gifts), 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 724 (1984).
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217. Id.
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child the disruption can surely be seen as working against the child’s
best interest.218
VII. THE CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
The Legislature could take various steps towards making the Es-
tates and Family Code cohesive with each other. At the very least, the
Legislature can add language to the Estates Code that directs to the
Family Code’s judicial discretion exception for purposes of conform-
ity. At most, the Legislature can change the Estates and Family Code
either for or against an emphatic right for adoptees to inherit through
and from their biological parents.
A. Add Another Exception to the Estates Code
The first, and probably most simple act the Legislature can do is to
add another exception to the Estates Code. The Legislature did this in
2005 when the Family Code changed adopted-adults inheritance
rights.219
The proposed statute in regards to Estates Code section 201.054(b)
could state:
(b) The natural parent or parents of an adopted child and the kin-
dred of another natural parent or parents may not inherit from or
through the adopted child, but the adopted child inherits from and
through the child’s natural parent or parents, except as provided by
Section 162.507(c) and Section 161.206(b), Family Code.
Another way to add the exception would be to explicitly state it in
the Estates Code:
(b) The natural parent or parents of an adopted child and the kin-
dred of another natural parents or parents may not inherit from or
through the adopted child, but the adopted child inherits from and
through the child’s natural parent or parents unless the court where
the parent-child termination occurred otherwise provides, except as
provided by Section 162.507(c), Family Code.
The Legislature would likely do this if they are unwavering as to
why the Family Code makes the exception in the first place. The ad-
ded wording to the Estate Code would help practitioners cross-refer-
ence directly to the Family Code.
B. Expand on the Judge’s Discretion
The statute leaves it unclear as to why or how a judge has discretion
over the matter. In Little v. Smith, the court says, “if the biological
parents want to foreclose the right of inheritance, they may petition to
have such a provision included in the order terminating parental
218. Id.
219. H.B. 204, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005).
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rights.”220 However, this seems unfair for a biological or adoptive par-
ent to request the child’s right to be terminated. Returning to policy
reasons supporting inheritance rights for adoptees, the child did not
choose or consent to lose their natural family for a new one. It seems
at odds with policy considerations that by a parent merely asking the
court for termination of inheritance washes away the child’s lack of
consent.
Without further explanation as to why a judge should sever the in-
heritance rights, the statute seems contrary to the legislative intent.
The Legislature clearly intends for adoptees to inherit when it is
known to them who their biological parents are. The Legislature could
possibly come up with limitations on when the judge could discrimi-
nate. If the Legislature believes an adoptee should still be able to in-
herit from and through the birth parents and cannot come up with any
limitations, then maybe the judicial discretion should be eliminated
for being out of line with the purpose of allowing adoptee inheritance
rights in the first place.
C. Eliminate the Judge’s Discretion
Another option would be to eliminate the judicial discretion in the
Family Code altogether. Policy reasons point to the adopted child hav-
ing a right to inherit from their natural parents because they did not
ask to be given up and forfeit their right. Although there are a number
of more policy reasons to consider against adoptee inheritance rights,
that does not necessarily guarantee the scale to be tipped in favor of
eliminating inheritance rights. If the Legislature so values an adoptees
inheritance rights, they could consider eliminating the judge’s discre-
tion all together.
D. Appoint a Guardian Ad Litem for Every Adoption Proceeding
If the Legislature were to keep the judge’s discretion and not make
the statutes synonymous, then a guardian ad litem should be ap-
pointed to the minor. A guardian ad litem can be a licensed attorney,
charitable volunteer, or professional who advocates for the child.221
The guardian ad litem is not bound by the same standards as an attor-
ney, as the guiding light for the guardian ad litem is the child’s best
interest.222 Therefore, the adopted child has someone representing his
or her best interests during the proceedings.
If the natural parents or adoptive parents petition the court to cut
off the adoptee’s inheritance rights from the biological parents after
220. Little v. Smith, 943 S.W.2d 414, 422 (Tex. 1997).
221. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.001(5) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.
of 84th Leg.).
222. Malinda L. Seymore, Sixteen and Pregnant: Minors’ Consent in Abortion and
Adoption, 25 Yale J.L. & Feminism 99, 147 (2013).
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the adoption, a guardian ad litem would be there to advocate for the
adopted child. A guardian ad litem could determine if it would be in
the best interest of the child for all strings to be cut in respect to the
natural parents, or if the child’s right should remain intact as the Es-
tates Code so expressly provides for. The guardian ad litem would
serve as a filter to meritless petitions to deny the child of his or her
statutorily given right.
E. Eliminate Inheritance Rights From and Through Natural Parents
Another solution could be to cut off inheritance rights from and
through the natural parents altogether. There are forty-six other states
that do not allow adoptees to inherit from their natural parents, so if
the Texas Legislature feels that the policy considerations against
adoptees inheritance rights outweigh considerations for inheritance
rights it may be time to change the statute completely. However, this
seems unlikely to happen since a statutory revision that repealed an
adopted adult’s inheritance rights took place in 2005, and it was made
a point to keep minor’s inheritance rights intact.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Returning to the hypothetical provided in the introduction, if Rod
Stewart, Joni Mitchell, and Kate Mulgrew did place their child for
adoption in Texas and did pass away intestate, could their biological
child have claim to inheritance rights? With the current structure of
the Family and Estates Code, it would all depend whether the adop-
tive or natural parents petitioned the court to sever those rights and if
a judge granted that petition.
The adopted children could have different outcomes based on what
happened in the adoption proceeding. However, Texas (has consist-
ently decided) that a child adoptee should keep their inheritance
rights through and from the natural parent since 1931.223 If Texas
strongly believes in adoptee’s inheritance rights and has withstood the
test of time when forty-six other states decided to take away
Adoptee’s inheritance rights, why does it make sense for different
adopted children to have different inheritance rights?
The above examples may be the extreme in the story from rags to
riches regarding natural parents, but it is possible for natural parents,
who may not have been able to once take care of their biological
child, to end up having a normal, comfortable life. It is also just as
possible for the biological family members to have an estate that
would have been passed on to the adoptee had they legally remained
part of the family. The Texas Legislature should consider keeping in
223. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. § 9 (1931).
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line with legislative history and policy and make a child adoptee’s in-
heritance right an absolute right for them to have forever.
